

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AR

PRIORITY
REVIEWED BY

DATE

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED ☒ RELEASABLE ☒

RELEASE DENIED ☐

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

Origin

ACTION: USNATO Brussels

Info:

EXDIS

SUBJ: ABM

CLEVELAND

DELIVER TO ~~XXXXXX~~ 9:00 AM

1. Following summarizes main points in Presidential statement on ABM to be released here at noon March 14. You should inform Perm Reps REPEAT not NAC/drawing upon this statement. Notification should not/be made prior to ~~XXXXXX~~ 4:00 p.m. Brussels time. You should emphasize this information must remain strictly confidential until after Presidential statement. ~~X~~ BEGIN TEXT.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM - The modified SENTINEL program is designed to fulfill the following objectives:

a. Protection for our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

b. Defense of our heavily populated areas against the kind of attack Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

c. Protection against the possibility of accidental or irrational attack from any source.

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Page 2 of telegram to US NATO BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL

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3. The program involves a phased deployment schedule closely aligned with the emerging Chinese and Soviet threats. Construction for the initial phase will take place at two of our MINUTEMAN fields: Malmstrom AFB, Montana and Grand Forks AFB, North ~~DAK~~ Dakota. Construction of radars and deployment of missiles ^{First of} at these sites is scheduled to be completed in four years.
4. The components of the system consist of (a) Perimeter Acquisition Radars for long-range detection of any kind of nuclear attack; (b) Missile Site Radars, for accurate guidance of the defense missiles to the incoming weapons; (c) SPARTAN missiles, for high altitude interception of attacking weapons, (d) SPRINT missiles, for lower altitude interception in the atmosphere to provide local protection.
5. Total investment costs for the full deployment will be about \$6.6 billion, some \$200 million more than Sentinel. However, budgetary requests for next year will be significantly less than what the previous Administration requested for Sentinel.
6. The full deployment schedule for the radars and missiles will be developed on the basis of careful assumptions of the threats existing at the time.
7. Completion of the system will provide:

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- a. Significant local protection for part of our Minuteman force plus the option for further expansion if threat justifies it.
- b. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Virtually complete area protection of the US against the early Chinese ICBM threat or against irrational attack by any country.
- c. Area protection for strategic bomber bases against attack from ballistic missile submarines or semi-orbital weapons.
- d. Significant protection for National Command Authorities against a moderately heavy attack.

8. COMPARISON OF PRESIDENT'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM WITH SENTINEL PROGRAM

A. PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM

- 1. CONCEPT: Program is designed to fulfill three objectives:
 - a. Protection for our land based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.
 - b. Defense of our heavily populated areas against the kind of attack Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
 - c. Protection against the possibility of accidental or irrational attack from any source.

2. MISSIONS

- a. DEFENSE OF MINUTEMAN - Provide significant local protection for part of our Minuteman force plus option for further expansion if

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the threat materializes.

b. AREA DEFENSE - Complete protection against early, unsophisticated Chinese ICBM threat, or against irrational attack by any country. Some protection against more sophisticated Chinese threat. Extensive area defense in all directions. By reducing number and relocating radar and missile sites and by enabling radars to look other than Northward, provides protection for bomber bases and cities against Soviet submarine launched or orbital space launched attacks. Radars and missiles will be relocated away from cities.

c. DEFENSE OF NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES - Has significant protection for principal National Command Authorities against moderately heavy attack.

d. PROTECTION OR DAMAGE LIMITATION AGAINST USSR - Still very limited, but better directional coverage. No organic basis for later installation of a cities defense.

e. PROTECTION AGAINST ACCIDENTAL OR IRRATIONAL ATTACK - Complete protection against such attacks from any source.

XX B. SENTINEL

1. CONCEPT:

Primary purpose: defense of the US against the early

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Chinese ICBM threat.

Secondary purpose: provide some ~~XXXXXX~~ local defense for Minuteman forces and the ~~XX~~ option to install full local protection of our Minuteman force if the threat materialized.

~~a. -- Provided minimal defense of Minuteman and an~~

2. MISSIONS

a. Defense of Minuteman - Provided minimal defense of Minuteman and an option for additional defense.

b. Area Defense - Area protection against attacks from the North, i.e., China only. No significant area protection of bombers or cities against attacks from Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SLBMs) or fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS). Radar and missile sites near cities.

c. Defense of National Command Authorities - Provided no more than for rest of country.

d. Protection or Damage Limitation Against USSR - Very limited and only against attacks from North; not designed for this purpose. However, maintains option of cities defense against Soviet threat.

e. Protection Against Accidental or Irrational Attack - Protection against such attacks from North only. END TEXT

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Page 6 of telegram to USNATO BRUSSELS

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9. RELATION TO SALT - You may draw upon following additional points from statement without direct quote:

This program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (a) technical developments, (b) the threat, (c) the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation... Since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modification as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China. We have taken cognizance of the view that beginning construction of a US ballistic missile defense would complicate an agreement on strategic arms with the Soviet Union. We do not believe that the evidence of the recent past bears out this contention. The Soviet interest in strategic talks was not deterred by the decision of the previous Administration to deploy the Sentinel ABM system - in fact, it was formally announced shortly afterwards. We believe that the modifications that have been made in the previous program will give the Soviet Union even less reason to view our defense effort as an obstacle to talks. Moreover, in any arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the US will be fully prepared to discuss limitations on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

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